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PUBLIC SAFETY v. INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES: SOME "FACTS" AND "THEORIES"
YALE KAMISAR
The author is Professor of Law in the University of Minnesota Law School. He is also a member
of the Advisory Committee on the Revision of the Minnesota Criminal Law. In 1960-1961, Professor
Kamisar was a Social Science Research Council Fellow, studying the prosecutor's discretion in the
State of Minnesota and the substantive criminal law "in practice." Prior to joining the faculty of
the University of Minnesota in 1957, he was engaged in the practice of law in Washington, D. C.
In the following article, Professor Kamisar replies to an article by Professor Fred E. Inbau, en-
titled "Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand," which appeared in
the March, 1962, issue of the Jonrnal (Vol. 53, No. 1) at pp. 85-89. The author responds to Inbau's
criticisms of criminal law decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court in recent
years, discussing in particular cases concerning the exclusion of confessions and illegally seized evi-
dence. He then examines the effect of the exclusionary rules upon police attitudes and practices,
weighs the value of these rules against possible alternatives, and analyzes the statistical evidence
pertaining to the effect of the exclusionary rules upon crime rates..- -EDITOR.
a#e facts that we dislike we call theories; the
theories that we cherish we callfacts."'
Professor Inbau detects a certain irrationality,
if not hysteria, in this business of excluding il-
legally seized evidence and unlawfully elicited
confessions "all being done in the name of 'civil
liberfies.' ' He pleads for" temperateness. No
emotive words, he begs. No shaking of the Bill of
Rights in our faces by "flag-waving civil liber-
tarians," please. 2 So, let us accompany him as he
approaches these critical issues of criminal law
administration calmly and dispassionately:
In order to maintain "public safety and security
from another kind of enemy right within our
borders," he asks, shouldn't we remove the "hand-
cuffs" the courts have placed on the police? Do
you want "unbridled individual liberties," he
continues, or a "safe, stable society?" Do you
believe in the "unconditional" "right to be let
alone" or are you willing to impose "reasonable
testraints" "in the interest of public safety and
public welfare?" Are you for or against decisions
and legislation which have the effect of "lending
aid and comfort to the criminal element?" Whose
side are you on, concludes Inbau, the side of law
and order-or the side of "the burglar, the robber,
the rapist?"'
IF. S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, in
THE LEGAL CoNscIeNcE 134 (L. K. Cohen ed. 1960).
2 See Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liber-
ties: The Prosecutor's Stand, 53 J. Camt. L., C. & P.S.
85, 86 (1962) (hereinafter referred to as "Inbau").
'See Inbau 85-86, 89; Inbau, The Social and Ethical
Requirements of Criminal Investigation and Prosecution,
3 Cas L. Q. (Canada) 329, 333, 350-51 (1960); Inbau,
Of course, Professor Inbau is scarcely the first
opponent of the exclusionary rule to respond to the
sound and fury of "starry-eyed civil libertarians"
with the voice of reason. For example, a genera-
tion ago, at the New York Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1938, the District Attorney of New York
County similarly resisted two proposals to exclude
evidence obtained in violation of guarantees
against unreasonable searches and seizures and
unreasonable interception of telephone communi-
cations. Alarmed because sponsors of these pro-
posals were submitting "something which is
dangerous, and concealed by high sounding
phrases,'4 he felt compelled "to place on the record
the facts about both":5
"Who are the people who would be protected
by these proposals? Call the roll: Al Capone,
Lucky Luciano, Waxie Gordon', Dutch Schultz,
Tootsie Herbert, and all the others.""
Another delegate to the convention more or
less threw Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin into the
fray:
"[I]f you vote for the [proposals]... you are
not alone aiding and abetting the crooks but
you are also aiding and abetting ... the Com-
munists ahd the Fascists and the Nazi... [TJhe
Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions,
52 Nw. U.L. REv. 77, 79 (1957).
4 1 NEw Yozx CONSTrTUTiOxAL CONVENTION,
RvisED REcoRD 369 (1938) (hereinafter referred to




people of this State care if an armory is set up
in our midst and that hou-e or home becomes an
armory of crooks or enemies from within and is
loaded down with machine guns, and there are
a hundred machine guns there, and bombs and
grenades, and then we will prohibit our law
enforcement agents: they are prohibited from
using evidence obtained illegally against those
enemies from within."7
As for the home-grown, garden-variety criminal,
observed this same delegate,
"[hf that propo-ition prevails there will be the
greatest single celebration in the City of New
York among the crooks and gangdom and
racketeers that was ever known in that city,
and from far and wide all the other racketeers
and murderers and kidnappers and embezzlers
will all collect into the City of New York to
celebrate this famous victory of the forces of
evil, so that they can be protected by the Con-
stitution of the State of New York.'8'
Sooner or later, no doubt, someone will come up
with the suggestion that the underlying purpose
of the bizarre gathering of "underworld overlords"
at Apalachin, New York, was to celebrate the re-
cent Benanti "victory" and/or to plot winning
strategy in the forthcoming Elkins and Mapp
cases.9
THE "INNOVATIONS" OF THE WARREN
COURT
It has become fashionable in some quarters to
hail virtually every important decision handed
71d. at 564. Cf. ABA, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS
OF SECTION OF CRIMINAL LAW 57-58 (1956): "Of
course [commented California prosecutor J. Francis
Coakley], the agents of the international criminal
conspiracy of communism who desire to undermine
and destroy our government also like these [recent
Supreme Court] decisions, because thereby the way
is made easier for them to pursue their trade ....
The pendulum has swung too far to the left and it
would be a good thing for this country if the pendulum
would swing back to the middle where it belongs. .. "
' NEW YORK CONVENTION 562-63. Cf. the testi-
mony of Edgar Scott, District of Columbia Deputy
Chief of Police, that the Mallory decision "is going to
encourage the criminals to come to Washington...
to commit their crimes. If a remedy is not found, that
is what is going to happen." Hearings Before the Special
Subcommittee To Study Decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States of the House Committee on the Judici-
ary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 47-48 (1957) (here-
inafter referred to as the "1957 House Committee Hear-
ingY'). A "remedy," i.e., the repeal or relaxation of
the .lcNabb-Mallory rule, was not found, but Chief
Scott's due predictions have not been borne out. See
text at notes 159-168, infra.
9 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 97 (1957),
down by the Warren Court as a radical departure
from reason and precedent. According to these
observers, whether or not-like the mule-recent
Supreme Court decisions lack hope of posterity,
they do lack pride of ancestry.
In this respect, Professor Inbau parts company
with his fellow-critics of the Mallory case.0 Most
of his brethren assumed an absolutely, positively
thunderstruck pose when Mallory was handed
down. While Inbau shares their distress, he can
hardly share their astonishment. His difficulty is
that 14 years ago he roundly condemned the
McNabb decision on the very grounds upon which
the Mallory case is now being criticized. At that
time he said of the Upshaw case, then pending in
the Supreme Court, that since the unreasonable
delay in taking the arrestee before a committing
magistrate preceded Upshaw's confession, "if the
Court really, meant what it seemed to say in the
.1fcNabb case, a reversal of the [conviction] is in
order."" The subsequent reversal in Upshaw dem-
barred use of wiretap evidence gathered by state offi-
cials in federal prosecutions. Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960), wiped out the "silver platter"
exception to the federal exclusionary rule, i.e., the
doctrine that illegally seized evidence may be used in a
federal prosecution if state officers present it to federal
authorities on a "silver platter." Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), rendered all evidence obtained by
unreasonable searches and seizures inadmissible in
state courts.
It has been said that the Apalachin meeting "points
up the need for strengthening law enforcement on a
statewide basis by permitting them to use modern
electronic devices to combat organized crime." NEW
JERSEY JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON
WIRETAPPING AND THE UNAUTHORIZED RECORDING
OF SPEECH 31 (1958) (minority recommendations).
The trouble with this conclusion is that for 13 years
prior to the meeting, the host, one Joseph Barbara,
Sr., had been pursued by a state trooper "in all ways
possible (including tapping of his telephone) and [he]
got no evidence of illegality, although he did get word
of the meeting if not of its purpose." United States v.
Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408, 419 (2d Cir. 1960) (Clark,
J., concurring).
10 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957),
reaffirming McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943), operates to exclude from federal prosecutions
all confessions or admissions elicited during pre-com-
mitment detention, whether or not they appear to he
voluntarily made.
" Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United
States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV. 442, 454-55(1948).
From the outset, the Department of Justice seemed
to perfectly comprehend the meaning of McNabb.
See, e.g., the Department's Circular No. 3793, dated
April 1, 1943: "The attention of all United States At-
torneys is directed to two recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court reversing convictions because of the ad-
mission of confessions made while the accused were
illegally detained by enforcement officers. McNabb v.
[Vol. 53
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onstrated that the Court did mean what it said.u
So did the later Mallory reversal. Thus, Inbau's
own writings on the subject amply demonstrate
that it was the Stone Court, per Frankfurter, J.,
which departed from the conventional voluntary-
trustworthy tests. The Vinson Court, per Black,
J., reaffirmed tis approach; the Warren Court,
per'Frankfurter, J., re-reaffirmed it.
Although Professor Inbau's prior writings have
narrowed the fronts on which he can attack
Mallory, he has more freedom of movement else-
where. Thus he registers shock and dismay over
the Court's "pronouncement" in Culombe v.
Connecticutu3 "that if it finds a criminal confession
has been coerced, the state court conviction will
be reversed even though it is 'convincingly sup-
ported by other evidence.' "14
Inbau's fear that C dombe signifies an ominous
trend is difficult to justify. Here, too, the Court
is simply restating "the rule of automatic reversal"
in coerced confession cases formulated by the
Stone and Vinson Courts.15 On at least two oc-
United States; Anderson v. United States, decided
March 1, 1943.. .. Although the opinions refer to
circumstances, e.g., ignorance of the accused, discom-
forts of place of detention, extended questioning, which
might be regarded as bringing into question the volun-
tary character of the confessions, the decisions are
expressly based upon failure of the arresting officers to
comply with statutory duty to bring arrested persons be-
fore a committing magistrate with reasonable promptness."(Emphasis in the original.)
12 Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
13367 U.S. 568, 621 (1961).
14 Inbau 87.
s See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597 n.1
(1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,404 (1945);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596,_ 599 (1948); Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952); Brown v. Allen;
344 U.S. 443, 475 (1953).
It is true that there is some language to the con-
trary in Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), a
confession case considerably complicated by the "un-
orthodox" New York trial procedures employed to re-
solve the voluntariness issue, see Meltzer, Involuntary
Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between
Judge and Jury, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 317, 319-39
(1!,54), and by the fact that the automatic reversal
doctrine was "put to a distorted use by the defense,"
who unsuccessfully sought an instruction that if the
jury found the confessions* involuntary they must
acquit, whereas the proper remedy is the granting of a
new trial. McCoMsci, EviDNFcE 245-46 n.27 (1954).
Most commentators concluded that Stein did not con-
stitute an abandonment of "the rule of automatic re-
versal." See McCoumcx, supra; Meltzer, supra at
339-54; Miller, The Supreme Court's Revieo of Hypo-
thetical Alternatives in a State Confession Case, 5 SYRA-
cusE L. REv. 53 (1953); Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amend-
ncnt and the Third Degree, 6.S-TA. L. REv. 411, 423-29
(1954). They did so largely for the reasons later ad-
vanced by the Court for adhering to the Lyons-Malin-
ski-Haley rule: "In that case [Stein] this Court did not
casions, Mr. Justice Reed, perhaps this genera-
tion's most "conservative" justice in these
matters, 6 made similar "pronouncements" on
behalf of the Court. He noted as early as 1944 that
"whether or not the other evidence in the record is
sufficient to justify the general verdict of guilty is
not necessary to consider" for if "admission of this
confession denied a constitutional right to de-
fendant the error requires reversal."'
The reason for the rule is not hard to find. As
Mr. Justice Whittaker observed for the Court:
"[The prosecution] suggests that, apart from the
confession, there was adequate evidence before
the jury to sustain the verdict. But where, as here,
a coerced confegsion constitutes a part of the evi-
dence before the jury and a general verdict is
returned, no one can say what credit and weight
the jury gaye to the confession.""
As might be expected, Professor Inbau has
some unkind things to say about MapP v. Ohio,19
although, since former U. S. Attorney General
Tom Clark wrote the" majority opinion he can
hardly blame this one-as he has others-on the
"ex-law professors.'uo Police and prosecutors
find that the confession was coerced. Indeed it was
there recognized that when 'the ruling admitting the
confession is-found on review to be erroneous, the con-
viction, at least normally, should fall with the con-
fession ....'" Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568
n.15 (1958).
16 See, e.g., his dissenting opinions in McNabb v.
United States, 318-U.S. 332,-347 (1943), and Upshaw v.
United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414 (1948).
17 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 32.2 U.S. 596, 597 n.1 (1944).
To similar effect is his statejaent in Brovn v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 475 (1953).18 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 US. 560, 567-68 (1958).
19 Inbau 86-87.20 Thu5, in recent testimony Professor Inbau (who
stressed at the outset that he did not appear "just in
that capacity" but as one with much "practical ex-
perience") explained how the McNabb "innovation"
came about, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess., on H.R. 11477, S. 2970, S. 3325 and S. 3355, at
58, 65 (1958) (hereinafter referred to as the "1958
Senate Committee Hearings"):
"Unfortunately, the United States Supreme
Court, and it was made up at that time of some even
more sensitive souls than we see, perhaps, at the
present time-there were some law professors on it,
ex-law professors--and they assumed that those
practices which were revealed in these [coerced con-
fession] decisions were commonplace, they were
universal, and the Court, acting in that feeling of
resentment, laid down in the McNabb case its so-
called civilized-standards rule."
Evidently Professor Inbau does not realize that
prior to mounting the teacher's platform "ex-law
professor" Frankfurter, author of the much-maligned
McNabb opinion, served several years as an assistant
U.S. attorney in the Southern District of New York,
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have been making grating noises about the exclu-
sionary rule in search and seizure cases for a long
time. For whatever questions may be raised about
the reliability of illegally procured confessions,
there is not likely to be much doubt about the
evidentiary value of illegally seized narcotics or
counterfeit money. Thus, down through the years
the exclusion of illegally seized physical evidence
has drawn the hottest fire from law enforcement
officers.
Mapp v. Ohio was hardly the beginning. If
anything, it was the culmination of a series of
developments. Then, when did it begin? This is
not an easy question to answer.
"All is fluid and changeable," observed Cardozo.
"There is an endless 'becoming.' '21 "In a sense,"
Lon Fuller has written, "the thing we call 'the
story' is not something that is, but something
that becomes; it is... as much directed by men's
creative impulses, by their conception of the story
as it ought to be, as it is by the original event
which unlocked those impulses.... The statute or
decision is not a segment of being, but, like the
anecdote, a process of becoming. By being rein-
terpreted it becomes, by imperceptible degrees,
something that it was not originally."'
Chief William H. Parker of the Los Angeles
Police Department might well say it began with
Wolf v. Coloradon where "for the first time in the
history of the Country the United States Supreme
Court applied the fourth amendment . . . to the
states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, and
thus began a whole new era."21 This takes us back
more than a decade.
Wigmore probably would point to "the heretical
influence of Weeks v. United States"25 which
"creates a novel exception, where the Fourth
Amendment is involved, to the fundamental
principle that an illegality in the mode of procuring
evidence is no ground for excluding it." 26 But we
have now travelled back a full half century. Back
to Mr. Justice Day, speaking for the White
Court;n and to Mr. Justice Holmes, steadfastly
and, then, an additional year as a special assistant
to the U.S. Attorney General.t1 CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
28 (1921).
FULLER, THE LAW In QUEST OF ITSELF 9-10
(1940).
" 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
u 1957, House Committee Hearings at 74.
26 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2184, at 32 (3d ed. 1940)
(hereinafter cited as "Wi~oRE").26 Id. at 36. (Emphasis in the original.)
7 Weeks v. United Stdtes, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
subscribing to and extending the "heretical"
principle with the ruling that "the essence of a
provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in
a certain way is that not merely evidence so ac-
quired shall not be used before the court but that
it shall not be used at all.
28
Perhaps Mapp's beginnings go back still further,
way back to the reign of Elizabeth I. At that time,
Wigmore tells us, the attorney-client privilege-
the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications--already appears as unques-
tioned." 29
The privilege which protects a witness against
self-incrimination and the privileges which shield
confidential communications between attorney
and client, husband and wife, physician and pa-
tient, and priest and penitent "do not in any wise
aid the ascertainment of truth, but rather they
shut out the light. Their sole warrant is the pro-
tection of interests and relationships which,
rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient
social importance to justify some incidental
sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the adminis-
tration of justice."30
If the sentiment of loyalty which attaches to
the attorney-client privilege, or the desire to pro-
mote full disclosure by the client, overrides the-
search for truth, what is so bizarre about regarding
the fourth amendment values and policies as more
important than this same search? If the search for
truth may be obstructed in the name of a physi-
cian-patient ot marital relationship, what is so
'fheretical" about doing so in the name of constitu-
tional guarantees?
Whether or not the exclusionary rule in search
and seizure cases is a late offshoot of the deeply-
rooted rules of privilege, the Mapp case is the
latest offshoot of the firmly-imbedded Weeks rule.
Here, as elsewhere, Professor Inbau cannot attack
this Supreme Court without scathing many pred-
- ecessor Supreme Courts as well.
Some 30 years ago, Professor John Barker
Waite, a long-time critic of the exclusionary rules,
observed that "such an issue as that in the Olin-
stead case is the perfect illustration of the judicial
function of evaluating conflicting interests."3' Why
can't the same be said for Mapp or Culombe or
Mallory? I approve of the recent Supreme Court
28 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
29 8 WGMORE §2290.
'0 McCoRBiucK, EVIDENCE 152 (1954).
3 Comment, 27 MICH. L. REV. 78, 82 (1928).
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decisions, but surely even those who deem them
unwise cannot have fbrgotten that "the right to
choose is not destroyed by the unwisdom of the
choice."n
Evidently, Professor Inbau is an ardent ex-
ponent of states "rights. He is noticeably disturbed
that Mapp destroyed the "full liberty" of state
courts and state legislatures to accept or reject
the exclusionary rule.
What is his reaction on learning that the Michi-
gan Supreme Court chose to adopt the McNabb-
Mallory rule?a This is cited as a sorry example of
what the Supreme Court "has already said and
done" "rubbing off" on the state courts, causing
them to "establish similar rules even though they
are not required to do so by any United States
Supreme Court decision."35  Professor Inbau
reiterates this point a moment later: The Michigan
Court "did so of its own volition, since the rule has
not thus far been labeled as a requirement of due
process."" Running through these comments on
the Michigan scene is a certain astonishment:
Don't those state judges realize they are not
supposed to do anything above and beyond the
minimum requirements of fourteenth amendment
due process!
The Supreme Court, charges Inbau, has "func-
Cardozo, J., in Pallocco v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236
N.Y. 110, 114, 140 N.E. 212, 213 (1923).Inbau 86.
34 People v. Hamilton, 357 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d
738 (1960). Professor Inbau tells us none of the facts
about the Hamilton case nor does he suggest the de-
cision might have been a response to local conditions.
Consider Bailer & Quick, Evidence and Criminal Law,
7 WA= L. REv. 51, 60-61 (1960):
"It is to be noted that the McNabb doctrine
was deemed necdssary in fact, because of the wide-
spread official gutting of the remedy of habeas cor-
pus, by failure to arraign. This is of a ipecial
significance in the City of Detroit where there is sub-
stantial evidence that the Recorders Court, in co-
operation with the police and prosecuting officials
had, before the Hamilton case, effectively debili-
tated the grand old remedy of habeas corpus by
providing that on application for habeas corpus the
police may still be allowed to hold a person not
charged with a crime for up to seventy-two hours
even though there is no evidence against the indi-
vidual. Indeed, persons illegally arrested were per-
mitted to be incarcerated for shocking periods of
time, even though not suipected of committing a
crime. It was done in the interest of practicality (a
defense not available to defendants)."
Perhaps it is not amiss to note that Kermit Bailer,
Esq., co-author of the above article, is not and never
has been a law professor, but was a former assistant
Wayne County prosecutor.
35 Inbau 87. (Emphasis added.)86 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
tioned at times as a super-legislative body."-
How does he take the news that the Illinois
legislature has prohibited law enforcement elec-
tronic eavesdropping? This, he protests "was the
work of some starry-eyed civil libertarians." 8 Of
course, if legislation is passed or state constitutions
are amended to achieve results desired by op-
ponents of the exclusionary rules, they tell us this
is because "the people... became sufficiently in-
censed."39 Sheriffs and police and prosecutors'
associations, they wbuld have us believe, never
pressure legislatures; only civil liberties groups
do. 40
Current talk about the courts' usurping legisla-
37 Inbau 86.
38 Id. at 88.39 Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 Mc. L.
REv. 169, 197 (1954), discussing the 1936 amendment
to the Micbigan Constitution which permitted the
introduction into evidence of illegally seized firearms
and blackjacks. Narcotic drugs were covered by fur-
ther amendment in 1952.
40 But cf. Samuel Dash, former trial attorney in the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice and
former District Attorney of Philadelphia, commenting
on the 1957 California scene, DAsH, KNowLToN &
SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS 199-200 (1959):
'"Because of these bills [prohibiting police use 6f
bugging equipment] on the one hand and on the
other the feeling of the police that additional laws
were needed to aid them in their investigations, the
Peace Officers Association of California joined with
the District Attorneys Association and the Sheriffs
Association of California to influence legislative
action. They prepared an impressive booklet which
set out in brief form all the proposed law-enforce-
ment billy. Under each bill, they printed in bold
type 'apSroved,' 'approved with amendment,' or
'disapproved.'
"A very active lobbying program was undertaken
by the law-enforcement organizations in Sacra-
mento. District attorneys and police chiefs were
assigned to meet with legislators during the legisla-
tive session and to persuade them to vote against
the bills the law-enforcement organizations dis-
approved and to vote for the bills they approved.
One police chief admitted that he had told a senator
on the judiciary committee investigating police
wiretapping and bugging that if he wanted to get
ahead politically, he had better stop interfering with
law enforcement. The police chief indicated that he
was speaking for the combined forces of the Peace
Officers Association, the District Attorneys Asso--
ciation, and the Sheriffs Association of the state of
California.
"The only bill that was finally enacted relating to
police bugging was the bill which the law-epforce-
ment organizations had marked 'approved.' Staff
members of the Regan Committee privately ad-
mitted that they had censored their own report and
had not pushed for police restrictions because of the
powerful influence of the law-enforcement groups.
The governor vetoed this bill on the ground that he
did not believe it was sufficiently restrictive of police
bugging activity. This maintained the status quo,
with the 1941 law permitting police bugging."
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five powers in the process of "policing the police" 4'
is difficult to reconcile with the tactics of ex-
clusionary rule opponents a generation ago. For
example, at the 1938 New York State Constitu-
tional Convention, those seeking to write the
exclusionary rule into the state constitution were
told to "leave it to the courts":
"If we are well advised we shall leave the con-
struction of the language of Constitution and
statute alike to our own courts, as we have
done hitherto. That process supplies, in a con-
stantly changing situation, the best and simplest
protection the individual and the public can
have."42
Following Olmstead v. United States," permitting
the use of wiretap evidence in federal courts, re-
gardless of state laws on the subject, a number of
attempts were made to prohibit or limit tapping.
In 1931, one such effort was resisted by Congress-
man Oliver of Alabama on the ground that "the
weight and effect" of wiretap evidence "under the
charge of the court, may properly be left to the
jury."44 When pressed by Congressman LaGuardia
as to where he would "draw the line in respect to
lawful and unlawful use of the wires," Congress-
man Oliver replied: "I said a few moments ago
that it is a matter that must largely address itself
to the courts and to the juries, under proper in-
struction." 45
If a transcendental principle pervades the camp
of exclusionary rule opponents, it seems to be
this: Whatever the arena in which civil liberties
groups choose to do battle, tell them they belong
in the other one!
THE "UNcoNDITIoNAL" RIGHT To
BE LET Aioi-E
Professor Inbau, for one, is against "unbridled
civil liberties" and "fed up with such platitudes as
'the right to be let alone'-when it is used as
though it were an unconditional right."46
Just what unbridled liberties and unconditional
rights does Professor Inbau have in mind? Cer-
tainly, Dolly Mapp wasn't asking for any when
several policemen forcibly opened the door to her
house, prevented her attorney from seeing her or
even entering the house, pulled a fake "warrant"
from her bosom after she grabbed it from one of
41 Inbau 86.42Nxw YoRY CoNVENTION 479-80.
43 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
44 74 CONG. R.c. 2903 (1931).
41 Id. at 2904.
41 Inbau 89. (Emphasis added.)
the officers who showed it to her, then "hand-
cuffed" her because she had been "belligerent" in
resisting their "rescue" of the "warrant" from her
persoh . Mr. Culombe would have settled for a
good deal less than an unconditional right of
privacy, too. "A moron or an imbecile" who
"spent six years in the third grade" and who "has
twice been in state institutions for the feeble-
minded," Mr. Culombe "did not see an attorney
until six days after he was first arrested and after
he had confessed to the police."4 8
In an article appearing in this Journal a year
ago, Professor Inbau urged legislation authorizing
"privately conducted police interrogation, cover-
ing a reasonable period of time, of suspects who
are not unwilling to be interviewed. '49 If the police
presently, lack such authority, this does evidence
an era of "unbridled liberties" and "uncondi-
tional rights." But do they? If the suspect is "not
unwilling," what's the problem? Why do the police
have to arrest him at all, let alone bring him before
a committing magistrate? "It would be absurd
to suggest that police must arrest a person before
they can ask him questions.""
Evidently, Professor Inbau does not share the
Supreme Court's view that "while individual cases
have sometimes evoked 'fluctuating differences of
view,'. . . it can hardly be said that in the over-all
pattern of Fourth Amendment decisions this
Court has been either unrealistic or visionary.""
But he cannot quarrel with the proposition that
4 7 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644-45 (1962).
48 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 639 (1961)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
49 Inbau, Police Interrogation-A Practical Necessity,
52 J. Cane. L., C. & P.S. 16, 20 (1961). See also id.
at 19.
50 Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335, 344(D.C. Cir. 1960). "Interrogation of suspects prior to
arrest is a valuable technique," recently observed the
U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, "and it is
widely utilized by the F. B. I." Memorandum From
Oliver Gasch to Maj. Robert V. Murray, Chief of the
Metropolitan Police, in Hearings on District of Colum-
bia Appropriations for 1961 Before a Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Appropriations, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 621 (1960) (hereinafter referred to as "Hear-
ings on District of Columbia Appropriations for 1961").
"Of course," added Mr. Gasch, "it should be empha-
sized that following arraignment [commitment] it is
possible to interrogate the individual concerned." Id.
at 622. Only last year, in this Journal, a commentator
with prior police experience of his own maintained
that "interviewing of a possibly concerned person has
legal and psychological advantages over interrogation
of an arrestee." Mueller, The Law Relating to Police
Interrogation Privileges and Limitations, 52 J. CRwb.
L., C. & P.S. 2, 12 (1961).
"Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
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"what the Constitution forbids is not all searches
and seizures, but unreasonable ones."'2
For example, in the recent Draper case,2 the
Court upheld an arrest (and accompanying search)
without a warrant, but based on a tip from a
known and "reliable" informer that petitioner was
peddling narcotics. The information was cor-
robbrated only to the extent that the informer's
detailed description of petitioner and report of
his whereabouts on a certain morning squared with
the arresting officer's observations. The Court
underscored the "large-difference" between "what
is required to prove guilt in a criminal case and
what is required to show probable cause for arrest
or search." ' In rejecting petitioner's contention
that the arresting officer's "hearsay" information
was insufficient to show probable cause or con-
stitute reasonable grounds, the Court recalled
that "in dealing with probable cause... we deal
with probabilities. These are not technical; they
are the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act."' 5
Similarly, in the still more recent Jones case,"'
the Court sustained a search warrant based on a
tip (corroborated by "other sources" and by the
fact that the persons implicated were known to be
addicts) from an unnamed but "reliable" informer
that petitioner and another were engaged in
illicit narcotic traffic and kept a ready supply on
hand. Jones reaffirms that with or without a war-
rant the arresting officer may "rely upon informa-
tion received through an informant, rather than
upon his direct observations, so long as the in-
formant's statement is reasonably corroborated." -"
Professor Inbau, no doubt, disagrees that Draper
and Jones illustrate the general principle. He
points to the rule first articulated in Gouled v.
United States5 some 40 years ago that objects of
"evidentiary value only" are beyond the reach
of an otherwise valid warrant or police officers
acting on "probable cause."59
I share Inbau's view that the Gouled rule is
2 Ibid.
5 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
"Id. at 312-13.
"5 Id. at 313, quoting with approval from Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
56Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
'7Id. at 269.
68255 U.S. 298, 309-11 (1921). See also, e.g., Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217, 237-38 (1960); Harris v.
United States, 33' U.F. 145, 154 (1947); United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464-66 (1932).
49Inbau 87. Actually, Professor Inbau points to
unsound and undesirable."0 So, it seems, does
just about everybody else-"liberal" or "conserva-
tive"-who has written on the subject.6' GouIed
is wrong because it departs from the fundamental
principles pervading search and seizure law. But
how does it follow that the fundamental principles
are also unsound?
To demonstrate the invalidity of a particular
application of a general rule is hardly to destroy
the general rule itself. If it were, neither the parol
evidence rule nor the hearsay rule nor the rule
against perpetuities nor any other familiar ride
could survive attack."
the recent (and questionable) application of the Goided
rule in Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
60See Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping
Problem: A Professor's View, 44 MINN. L. REv. 891,
914-18 (1960). The rule has far more often been pro-
fessed in terms than followed in practice; "while 'a
search for an object of purely evidentiary significance'
may be taboo, objects have been and will continue to
be found to possess a bit more than 'purely eviden-
tiary significance' just about whenever a resourceful
judge wants to so find." Id. at 917. See also Broeder,
The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NEB. L.
REV. 185, 211-13 (1961).
In any event, Professor Inbau's fears that "mere
evidence"-non-documentary in nature-must now be
excluded from state courts seem unfounded. For one
thing, it is by no means clear that even in the federal
courts the rule extends to non-documentary objects of
purely evidentiary significance. See generally Com-
ment, 20 U. CaI. L. REv. 319 (1953). For another,
"whatever Gouled's contemporary vitality in the fed-
eral system, the point is that it rests both on the fourth
as well as the fifth amendment, and that it is the fifth
rhther than the fourth which precludes the admission
of the purely evidentiary items. Mapp's exclusionary
doctrine on the other. hand rests solely on the fourth
amendment so far as the states are concerned. Thus,
if Goaled depends both on the fourth and fifth, the
doctrine would appear inapplicable* to the states."
Broeder, supra at 212. See also Weinstein, Local Re-
sponsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure
Practice, 34 ROCKY Mr. L. REv. 150, 161, 174 n.122
(1960).
6See, e.g., MAGUIRE, EVMENCE or GUILT 183
(1959); 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENcE §2184a, at 45 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961); Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law
of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 65, 66 (1957).
62Of course, over the years, opponents of the ex-
clusionary rule have worked both sides of the street.
They have sought to invalidate the basic principle
not only by pointing to the Gouled doctrine, which
goes too far, but also by citing the late "silver platter"
doctrine-which did not go far enough. Thus, at the
1938 New York Constitutional Convention, opponents
of the Weeks rule turned again and again to the "silver
platter" doctrine as proof that "the Federal courts
have been compelled to depart from their own rule
in order that the guilty may not escape," NEw YORE
CONVENTION 372; that "these exceptions to the rule
illustrate its basic unsoundness," ibid.; that "they
[the Supreme Court] found in individual cases that the
rule had to be limited, and they limited it so that it was
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At this point, Professor Inbau would probably
trot out a decision which has nothing to do with
the Gouled rule-Work v. United States,6 the
famous (or infamous) "garbage can" case. This
case, Inbau tells us, establishes "the sanctity of
the garbage can."' ' This case, Inbau insists,
"illustrates the general principle.y 65
ridiculous," id. at 467; that there is "no great funda-
mental principle involved in this debate... because
if there was, then the judges of the Supreme Court of
the United States are also unprincipled because...
they also say.. . and have allowed in our Federal
courts down through the years evidence to be used
that is procured by officers connected with the local
political bodies," id. at 527.
No sooner was Elkins handed down, than opponents
of the exclusionary rule hastened to the other side of
the street. Elkins became support for the view that the
Court is "willing to serve as a super-censor and super-jury over state practices.... Apparently improper
searches and seizures carried out by state officers now
are deemed to violate the fourteenth amendment due
process clause, without regard to the constitutional
and statutory provisions provided by the states them-
selves to govern conduct of their own law enforcement
officers." George, "The Potent, The Omnipresent
Teacher": The Supreme Court and Wire-tapping, 47
VA. L. REV. 751, 782 (1961).
Would it not be more appropriate for Professor
George to direct his attack at the scope of the sub-
stantive right rather than the Elkins decision imple-
menting it? Improper state searches and seizures had
been deemed to violate fourteenth amendment more
than a decade earlier-in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949). From that date (with the probable exception
of the fifth amendment-oriented Gouled rule), any
state provision purporting to narrow the substantive
protection afforded by the federal constitution against
unreasonable search and seizure was invalid. See Allen,
The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the
Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1, 6-11 (1950); Kamisar,
Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence
in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083,
1101-08 (1959); af. Foote, Safeguards in the Law of
Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 36-44 (1957).
Professor George is distressed that Elkins showed
little regard for state law governing local officers. He is
not disturbed at all, however, over what the "silver
platter" doctrine might have been doing to federal law
governing federal officers. Consider, e.g., the remarks of
Delegate T. J. Curran, an opponent of the exclusionary
rule: "I was for four years an assistant United States
attorney in the Southern District of New York. As a
matter of fact, there is no Federal rule, if we mean by
'Federal rule' an inviolate principle of law that the
Federal courts always enforce.... For instance,
Federal officers always work with local police officers.
And what happens?... They then say to the local
police officers, 'We will now leave you to conduct the
illegal search.., and when you get the evidence, you
will go to the court and submit the evidence,' and that
evidence is accepted. And there are thousands of cases
in the Southern District of New York in which con-
victions were obtained by that method, and the same
rule applies throughout this country." NEw YoRK
CONVENTION 527. See generally Kamisar, supra at
1177-90.
83243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
64 1958 Senate Committee Hearings at 74.65 Ibid.
The facts in Work, according to Inbau, are quite
simple: "Looking into a narcotic peddler's garbage
can was held to be an unreasonable search.""8
"That particular case is an outrage, the case
where, because the police rooted in somebody's
garbage can and found evidence of narcotics...
the narcotics peddler went free."' ' Can it really
be that that's all there is to the Work case? Let's
take a closer look.
Without a warrant, and admittedly without
cause to make a search or arrest absent a warrant,
two police officers entered petitioner's dwelling
place. Then, petitioner walked past the officers
and-out of the house to an area under the porch.
The officers followed her and saw her put some-
thing (which turned out to be narcotics) into a
trash can located in the porch area, within the
"curtilage" of her home.8 "It would be unac-
ceptably naive," declared the court, "to conclude
that this attempt by her to hide [the phial] im-
mediately following the presence of the officers in
the hall, and that the finding of the phial by the
officers, were not direct consequences of their
unlawful entry." 9
Work does not establish the "sanctity of the
garbage can" any more than does Williams v.
United States70 the "sanctity of the precinct
station corridor." In the Williams case, defendant
was illegally arrested on the street, ordered into
a police car, and driven to a precinct building. As
he was being marched through the corridor leading
to "the desk" where suspects are booked and
searched, he dropped a cigarette package (con-
taining narcotics) in an unsuccessful attempt to
rid himself of the incriminating evidence before he
reached "the desk." The evidence was suppressed
as the "product" of a fourth amendment viola-
tion; the "throwing away" occurred as the result
of and only because of the unlawful arrest2'
If Work and Williams do illustrate a "general
principle," it is one that Professor Inbau appears
to have missed: The courts will look at the totality
of the circumstances and when they conclude that
the proffered evidence was the "product" or
"fruit" of an unreasonable search or seizure they
61 Inbau 87.
67 1958 Senate Committee Hearings at 74. To the same
effect is Peterson, The Crooks Get All the Breaks, Sat.
Eve. Post, Sept. 23, 1961, pp. 10, 13.
I 243 F.2d at 661-62.89 Id. at 662.
70 237 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
See Kainisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Con-
temporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a
Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. ILL.
L.F. 78, 126-28, especially n.224.
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will do the same thing in off-beat cases that they
do in routine ones-they will exclude it.
AN EXERCISE ix FutliTY?
Whatever may be said for the courts "preserving
the judicial process from contamination"2 or
against the government playing "an ignoble
part"" or about it being the "omnipresent
teacher,'"' I, for one, would hate to have to
justify throwing out homicide and narcotic and
labor racket cases if I did not believe that such
action significantly affected police attitudes and
practices.'l At this point, however, I run smack up
against Professor Inbau's grim, gray "facts":
"Although a trial judge or prosecutor may
well be sensitive to a reversal on appeal, and
consequently the reversal may serve to dis
cipline him to avoid error and misconduct in
the future, such a reaction cannot reasonably
be expected from the police. They are generally
insensitive to a court's rejection of evidence
merely because of the impropriety of the
methods used to obtain it.'n G
"[T]he average police officer whose confession
[and presumably whose search] is declared in-
valid suffers no embarrassment or loss of
prestige.... The clearance of a case by arrest
... is all that really matters so far as the average
policeman is concerned; what happens thereafter
is the responsibility of the prosecutor and the
courts.'"
72 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484
(1928) (Brandeis, H., dissenting).73Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).7 Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Compare
Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by
the Police, 52 J. CGRI. L., C. & P.S. 255, 257-58 (1961),
w/ith George, supra note 62, at 785-93, and McGarr,
The Exclusionary Ride: An Ill-Conceived and Ineffective
Remedy 52 J. CRiu L., C. & P.S. 266, 267 (1961).
76 "[jit would seem that the ultimate test of the ex-
clusionary rules is whether they deter police officials
from engaging in the objectionable practices. For if,
as some assert, reversals of convictions in this area
have had no substantial effect on police conduct, then
the consequent gains even in terms of popular respect
for law are tenuous, indeed." Allen, Due Process and
State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L.
REv. 16, 34 (1953).
76 Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and
Confessions, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 77, 78 (1957).
7 Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United
States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442, 461-62
(1948). But cf. INBAU & REI, LIE DETECTION AND
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 198 (3d ed. 1953) ("a prac-
tical and useful manual for criminal interrogators,"
according to p. ix): "A criminal interrogator should
always remember that it is his function not only to
obtain a confession from a guilty subject, but also to
Coming from one with Professor Inbau's practi-
cal experience, these are telling blows. But more
impressive, I submit, are the recent words and
deeds of high law enforcement officials to the con-
trary. Evidently, there are jurisdictions where
somebody up there-the attorney general or the
district attorney or the chief of police-cares
enough to make the average policeman care too.
Consider the post-Cahan observations of the
Attorney General of the State of California:
"I believe ...that because of this decision
the police are doing better work. Their investi-
gations-are more thorough and within American
constitutional concepts. More guilty pleas have
resulted because of the intensive pre-arrest
work. For example, District Attorney Tom
Lynch of San Francisco has advised me that in
gambling and narcotic raids, as well as in other
cases, the police discuss the facts with him and
he is able to advise in advance just what is neces-
sary in order to make a good case.
"In a great many instances, prior to the
Cahan decision the police were satisfied with an
arrest. They were not too concerned with con-
viction because the apprehension of the in-
dividual was sufficient in their minds. In these
cases the defendant, upon his dismissal, would
feel that the State was an equal violater of the
law.
"In the field of narcotics, much more intensive
work is being done with the peddler, the whole-
saler and the seller. Prior to the Cahan case, the
officers, in order to justify their existence, felt
it necessary to make a certain number of arrests.
It was always easy to arrest a known addict
upon mere suspicion rather than do the tough,
thorough work of getting to the wholesaler and
peddler.
"I believe the over-all effects of the Cahan
decision, particularly in view of the rules now
worked out by the Supreme Court, have been
excellent. A much greater education is called
for on the part of all peace officers of California.
As a result, I am confident they will be much
better police officers. I think there is more co-
operation with the District Attorneys and this
obtain one which meets all the necessary legal require-
ments-so that it can be used as evidence at the trial of
the accused. For this reason, familiarity with the law
concerning criminal interrogations is in many respects
equally as important as a mastery of the psychological
tactics and techniques employed in eliciting. the con-
fession." (Emphasis added.) This passage opens a 35
page discussion of "The Law Concerning Criminal
Confessions."
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will make for better administration of criminal
justice."7 8
What of the experience in the District of
Columbia, site of the McNabb-Mallory rule, as
well as the Weeks doctrine? In large measure,
the hopes and expectations of exponents of the
exclusionary rule have been fulfilled on two
counts.79 Listen to Oliver Gasch, in his fifth year
78Excerpts from letter from Governor Edmund G.
Brown, then Attorney General of the State of Cali-
fornia, to the Stanford Law Review, Dec. 7, 1956, on
file with the Stanford Law Review, quoted in part in
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 220-21 (1960),
and in part in Note, 9 STAN. L. REv. 515, 538 (1957).
I am indebted to the editors of the Stanford Law Re-
view for sending me a photostatic copy of the letter,
which is on file in the Minnesota Law Library. The
Cahan reference is to People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
282 P.2d 905 (1955), which saw the California Supreme
Court overturn precedents of more than 30 years stand-
ing to adopt the exclusionary rule.
As Professor Barrett has pointed out, Barrett,
Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-
A Comment on People vs. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. Rv.
565, 587 (1955), prior to the Cahan decision, "the
California situation was most unsatisfactory....
"The rules were ill-defined. There was little direct
pressure upon the police to conform to the rules. In
practice, police discretion in determining the reason-
ableness of searches was rarely subject to check. The
possibilities of the situation improving appeared slight.
aw enforcement groups preferred the ambiguity of
seldom-litigated rules and had no real incentive to
take the risks involved in seeking legislative action."
The Cahan case led to the appointment of an Attor-
ney General's Committee, whose recommendations in
turn led to extensive new legislation, in many respects
clarifying and codifying the case law on arrest and
search and seizure, although not without raising some
new problems. See 32 CAre. STATE B.J. 607-10
(1957). Furthermore, as Professor Weinstein has re-
cently noted, the state has compiled applicable Cali-
fornia decisions in "a simple but well-written training
publication for California peace officers that makes
clear by hypothetical and rule what the police can
and cannot do." Weinstein, supra note 60, at 169-70.
7 I am indebted to Bernard Weisberg, a member of
the Chicago Bar and General Counsel of the Illinois
Division of the American Civil Liberties Union, for
alerting me to much found in the succeeding text by
his careful summary of the District police's adaption
to the McNabb-Mallory rule in Weisberg, Police In-
terrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52
J. CiAm L., C. & P.S. 21, 33-34 (1961).
I want to make it quite clear that my reliance on the
striking District of Columbia experience does not mean
that I quarrel with the proposition that the desire to
obtain convictions (as opposed to police "harrass-
ment") and "the policeman's remediable ignorance of
the law" "constitute only a part of the explanation
for American police misconduct." Allen, Federalism
and the Fourth Amendement: A Requiem for Wolf,
1961 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 37. See also Barrett, Personal
Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment,
1960 StnP. CT. REv. 46, 54-55. But to concede that the
exclusionary rule is not always decisive is hardly to
agree it is never significant.
Professor Allen has pointed to "a large middle-
as United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia at the time:
"In view of the widely divergent views con-
cerning the meaning and effect of the Mallory
decision, we felt that it was highly desirable to
initiate a series of lectures to which supervisory
officials of the Police Department and the de-
tective force would be invited. These lectures
were given about two years ago and in sub-
stance they have been repeated on a number of
occasions both to the retraining classes of
policemen as well as to the new men. We have
encouraged questions both during the lectures
and at the conclusion thereof. Our Mallory
lectures have been printed by the congressional
committee studying this subject.
"At the present time, due largely to the
conscientious cooperation of our Chief of Police
and in accordance with the teaching of the
decisions and our lectures on it, the police are
making better cases from the evidentiary stand-
point. Extensive investigation prior to arrest of
suspects has resulted. The accumulation of other
evidentiary material has become standard
operating procedure. It has been emphasized
to the force that they may arrest only on prob-
able cause and that persons arrested should be
western city in a jurisdiction which for almost forty
years has applied the exclusionary rule" where-until
recently-the police department did little to inform
itself of current search and seizure law. See Allen,
supra at 39. What does this necessarily prove other
than that the exclusionary rule per se is not a "cure-all"?
Other than that the exclusionary rule ipso facto can-
not override the ill effects of poor leadership and tradi-
tion and/or low general quality and inadequate general
training? That the exclusionary rule is wasted on some
police departments scarcely establishes that it fails
significantly to affect the work of better ones.
Is there any doubt that prior to Mapp the police
departments of many more exclusionary states than
admissibility states (if any) did demand extensive
training in the rules of arrest and search and seizure?
See, e.g., the late Justice Murphy's mail questionnaire
study of police practices in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 44-46 (1949) (dissenting opinion). Denver is the
only specific example given of a city in an admissibilityjurisdiction providing fairly comprehensive instructions
on search and seizure, id. at 46. But the Denver in-
struction manuals Justice Murphy evidently referred
to do not bear him out. As was recently observed in
Weinstein, supra note 60, at 159 n.45, "the second
edition of MELVILLE, MANUAL or CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
IN COrORADO (1954) [written for Denver Police Acad-
emy] contains an extensive discussion of how con-
fessions should be obtained in order to make them
admissible (pp. 16-21); it ignores the search and seizure
problem, thus furnishing striking evidence of the impact
of an exclusionary rule on police training programs."
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given a preliminary hearing without unneces-
sary delay. Even though a panel of our Ap-
pellate Court decided... that the Mallory
decision does not require a preliminary hearing
in the middle of the night, we have followed the
practice of having preliminary hearings in
the middle of the night in those cases in which
cuestion may arise as to the imposition of a
sanction because of failure to comply with
Rule Sa of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
"With respect to search and seizure ... about
two years ago, it became very evident to me
that the time had come for training and re-
training in the field of search and seizure....
This project was one of the most useful ac-
tivities of our office in my judgment. These
four lectures were recorded, carefully annotated,
and have recently upon order of the Attorney
General been distributed to all Federal law
enforcement officers. You may be interested in
how we set up these lectures. We asked the
Chief of Police to circularize his entire force
and to solicit from them questions in the field
of search and seizure which gave them diffi-
culty. We broke these questions down into
three groups. Searches and seizures with war-
rants, searches and seizures incident to lawful
arrests, and emergency situations. Using en-
tirely for problem material the questions of
the police force, we developed this series of four
lectures. We in the prosecutor's office benefitted
greatly by the need to go to the books and to
analyze the rationale of the decisions for answer-
ing the questions presented.
"I am sufficiently optimistic to report to
you that most of the policemen benefitted as
well by these lectures. My men have given me
a number of examples which indicate quite
clearly that our policemen are thinking in
terms of these decisions and our lectures, and
to that extent their work has materially im.-
proved. Searches and seizures as far as possible
are now bottomed upon a search warrant. The
police realize that it renders more effective
their work to check out the legal basis for the
warrant with legally trained persons before
attempting to accomplish a search or seizure."80
80 Gasch "Law Enforcement in the District of
Columbia and Civil Rights" pp. 2,3, 5, unpublished
address of March 25, 1960, to Twelfth Annual Con-
ference, National Civil Liberties Clearing House,
I am hardly in a position to appraise the general
effect Mapp v. Ohio has had in those jurisdictions
which used to admit illegally seized evidence. I
think I do know that in at least one such juris-
diction, my home state of Minnesota, law en-
forcement training has already been substantially
affected by the exclusionary rule and will con-
tinue to be so. Witness the attitude of the At-
torney General of the State of Minnesota at one
of several post-Mapp conferences on police pro-
cedures relating to the law of arrest and seizure:
"It is my personal opinion that the Mapp
case is sound law. Years of experience demon-
strate that the only way in which the Fourth
Amendment 'can be made meaningful is to
declare illegally-obtained evidence inadmis-
sible-in short, to remove the incentive for
obtaining evidence through illegal means and
to make it essential for police officials to become
skilled in the proper legal methods by which
their cases can be built. The very fact that
these institutes are being held is eloquent testi-
mony, it seems to me, of the basic wisdom of
the Court's decision. We are doing today,
because of the Court's ruling, what we should
have done all along. We are studying ways in
which we can bring our police methods and
procedures into harmony with the constitu-
tional rights of the people we serve.
"Some persons claim the Supreme Court has
gone too far. Others claim to know how con-
stitutional protections may be avoided by
tricky indirection. Both viewpoints are wrong-
this Institute was called to assist us in better
fulfilling our sworn duty to uphold the Constitu-
tion. It was not called to second guess the
Supreme Court.
"For those who seek techniques to circum-
vent the constitutional rights of the people, I
say that it is not only illegal, but contrary to
our oath and destructive of the basic principles
of a free society to do so. As Attorney General
of this state, I do riot propose to permit our
Constitution to be circumvented and I serve
notice upon anyone so inclined." 81
in Washington, D. C., reported in the Washington
Post, March 26, 1960, p. D1, col. 7 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "Gasch"). I am indebted to Bernard Weis-
berg of the Chicago Bar for sending me a copy of this
address, which is now on file in the Minnesota Law
Library.
81 Mondale, The Problein of Search and Seizure, 19
BENCH & BAR or MnN. 16, 19 (Feb. 1962).
1962]
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To observe that the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rules has fallen far short of expecta-
tions in jurisdictions other than those mentioned
above is hardly to condemn. So-for millenia-has
the deterrent effect of the laws against murder,
rape, and robbery.
The recent experience in the State of California
and the District of Columbia, and the post-Mapp
prospects in Minnesota, by no means constitute
conclusive evidence of the efficacy of the ex-
clusionary rules. But they do, I think, rudely
dislodge the notion that these rules are merely
an exercise in futility.
MIGHT THERE BE A BETTER WAY?
If the jaded debate over the exclusionary rules
has accomplished anything, it has illustrated
once again that "answers are not obtained by
putting the wrong question and thereby begging
the real one. ' ' s What are the real questions? One of
them, surely, turns on what we should appraise
the exclusionary rule against.
The fact that there is disagreement and in-
conclusive evidence that the exclusionary rule
substantially deters police lawlessness is a good
deal less significant, I think, than the fact that
there is much agreement and abundant evidence
that all other existing alternatives do not.-' Thus,
proponents of the rule are in good position if
one major question is whether or not the ex-
clusionary rule is the best presently available,
politically feasible means of effectuating the
constitutional safeguards. Evidently, this is
not good enough for opponents of the rule. The
question they like to ask is whether the exclu-
sionary rule is the very best approach to police
misconduct that man ever conceived, or ever will!
Why does it have to be?
Suppose it can be shown that the present system
of criminal law administration is irrational and
illogical. That "punishment for a period of time
and then letting him go free is like imprisoning a
diphtheria-carrier for awhile and then permitting
him to commingle with his fellows and spread the
8 Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Priebe & Sons,
Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 420 (1947).
83 A number of vigorous opponents of the exclusion-
ary rules have recognized the futility of existing alter-
natives. See, e.g., remarks of former federal prosecutor
T. J. Curran, Nxw YoRK CoNVENTION 529; McGarr,
The Exclusionary Rule: An Ill-Conctived and Ineffective
Remedy, 52 J. Cane L., C. & P.S. 266, 268 (1961)
(another former federal prosecutor); Plumb, Illegal
Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORELL L.Q. 337, 386-88
(1939).
germ of diphtheria?"8 1 If so, it is imperative that
we strive for improvement, but does it follow we
should burn up the statute books in the mean-
time-before we have attained the requisite
number of trained "social physicians" who can
determine and remove the cause of crime with
the same degree of accuracy that the surgeon
finds and cuts out an inflamed appendix? 5
Suppose it can be demonstrated that "fiendish
perpetrators of horrible crimes on children could
be reformed by being sent first for several years
to a special hospital" and that "a certain social
environment or... an elaborate college course
will reform a burglar or gunman?"86 Suppose,
further, all hands agree that logically, theoretically,
ideally, this sort of "treatment" and "re-educa-
tion" is much to be preferred over "punishment?"
Does it follow that we scrap what we have now
in exchange for the hope or promise that ten or
twenty or fifty years from now we might have the
community support, the large funds, and the
necessary psychiatric know-how -to make the
theoretically superior alternative a reality?m
I share Wigmore's view that the Weeks rule is
"illogical." '8 I agree, too, that "the natural way
to do justice here would be to enforce the healthy
principle of the Fourth Amendment directly,
i.e., by sending for the high-handed... marshal
who had searched without a warrant, imposing a
thirty day imprisonment for his contempt of the
Constitution, and then proceeding to affirm the
sentence of the convicted criminal."8 9 But what
does all this mean? It means, I take it, that we
are afforded the opportunity to repeal the ex-
clusionary rule now." But when-if ever-do we
get the chance to vote for legislation authorizing
courts to send for the transgressing marshal and
imprison him for his "contempt of the Constitu-
14A criticism quoted in Cardozo, What Medicine
-Can Do for Law, in LAw Aim LrrERArutn 90 (1931).
85 See M. R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal
Law, in RIASON AND LAw 45 (1950).86 Id. at 45-46.
8 See id. at 46; Dession, Psychiatry and the Condi-
tioning of Criminal Justice, 47 YALE L.J. 319, 332-35
(1938).
88 8 WiG Eooa 35.9 Id. at 40.90 The debate has long been bottomed on the prem-
ise that the exclusionary rule is a rule of evidence which
the Congress or the state legislatures could "repeal."
Mapp changed all that. See Weinstein, supra note 60,
at 155. For purposes of discussion, however, I am as-
suming that either a constitutional amendment orjudicial overruling has occurred, so that we are still
"free" to "repeal" the rule.
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tion?" And what do we use to effectuate the Fourth
Amendment in the meantim?
Those seeking the repeal of the exclusionary
rule have often conceded the inadequacy of
existing alternative remedies. 91 As a quid pro quo
for the abolition of the rule, they have proposed,
e.g., the establishment of a civil rights office,
independent of the regular prosecutor, "charged
solely with the responsibility of investigating
and prosecuting alleged violations of the Con-
stitution by law enforcement officials";12 "shifting
the financial responsibility for improper conduct
of policemen, on a respondent superior basis, to the
municipality or sovereign which employs them."'"
Have we ever known an opponent of the ex-
clusionary rule to introduce a bill spelling otit
such proposals? Have we ever heard of a peace
officers or sheriffs or district attorneys associ-
ation 'qobbying" for such a proposal? When-if
ever-they do, the case for the exclusionary rule
will be much weakened. I ask again, what do we
do in the meantime?
I am sure that Professor Inbau and many
people in law enforcement work would guffaw
at the suggestion that adoption of the "British
System" of narcotics control (permitting doctors
to furnish narcotics to addicts in certain cases) is
the way to eliminate our narcotics problem.
Inbau, no doubt, would share the view that the
"British System" is inapplicable to the United
States. No doubt, he would retort, as others
have, that the favorable narcotic situation in
England is not the result of the "British System"
at all but "the British people themselves ....
[They] have a definite abhorrence of narcotic
drugs, which has become incorporated into their
mores and culture."'"
Fine. But why, then, does Professor Inbau so
blithely point to the fact that "the free, law abiding
countries of England and Canada have always
admitted evidence even though it may have been
,unreasonably seized?"9 5 Why does he not touch
91 See note 83 supra.
12 Peterson, Restrictions in the Law of Search and
Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 46, 62 (1957). The disad-
vantages of this proposal are considered in Paulsen,
The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police,
52 J. CRm L., C. & P.S. 255, 261 (1961).
93 McGarr, supra note 83, at 268. See also Plumb,
supra. note 83, at 387.
94 Set CAL. SPECrIA STunv CO'N ON NARCOTICs,
FINAL REPORT 101 (1961).91 n Ibau 86. To say that England has "always"
admitted unreasonably seized evidence is to be some-
what misleading. As late as 1955, there was only one
on "the speed and certainty with which the
slightest invasion of British individual freedom
or minority rights by officials of the government
is picked up in Parliament, not merely by the
opposition but by the party in power, and made
the subject of persistent questioning, criticism,
and sometimes rebuke?" 0 Why does he not allude
to recent observations that-
"It must be surprising to any student who is
not thoroughly immersed in English ways of
thought to find that in a country where so
much importance is attached to the liberty of
modem case bearing on the point, Elias v. Pasmore,
[1934] 2 K.B. 164, 173, (a decision of a judge of first
instance at that) and a survey of Commonwealth
authority at that time revealed no uniform rule on the
admissibility of evidence procured through illegal
searches and seizures. See Cowen & Carter, The Ad-
rmissibilitj of Evidence Procured Through Illegal Searches
and Seizures, in ESSAYS o THE LAw or EVmENCE 82-
83, 100 (1956). That year, when, according to one
commentator, "the lower courts in the Unitid Kingdom
seemed ready to revise [the rule of admissibility] if
not to reject it," Franck, Comment, 33 CAN. B. Rv.
721, 722 (1955), a decision of the Privy Council in
Kuruma v. The Queen, [19551 1 All E.R. 236, sanc-
tioned the admissibility of evidence illegally obtained.
Professor Glanville Williams, the English partia-
pant in the Northwestern Law School's recent Inter-
national Conference on Criminal Law Administration,
criticized Kuruma on numerous counts: the opinion
indicates that evidence obtained by "trickery" should
be ruled out, but not that obtained by unlawful force-
seemingly a "more flagrant breach of the law"; one
of the possible reasons for excluding induced confes-
sions-"to hold the police and prosecution to proper
behaviour"-"would equally suggest the exclusion of
evidence obtained by an illegal search"; American
decisions to the contrary were omitted and "quite
possibly misunderstood" [only Olnstead was cited;
not, for example, the earlier Weeks case nor the later
Nardone cases]; Scottish decisions to the contrary
"were misinterpreted and misstated." Williams, The
Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign nzw: England, 52
J. Cum. L., C. & P.S. 272, 273 (1961). Professor Wil-
liams notes wistfully that "since decisions of the Privy
Council are not absolutely binding in future cases
even upon the Privy Council itself, this important ques-
tion of public policy cannot be regarded as finally
settled." Ibid. Most English and Canadian writers
share Williams' dissatisfaction with the Kuruma result.
See, e.g., Cowen & Carter, supra at 103-05; DELiN,
THE CRIMINAL PRosEcuToN mN ENGLAND 64-65 (1958)(criticizing the earlier Pasmore case); Franck, supra
at 723-31.
16 JACKSON, THE SUPREmME CoURT IN TH AMERICAN
SySTEn Op GOVERMENT 81-82 (1955).
See also Martin, The Exclusionary Rule Under
Foreign Law: Canada, 52 J. Camn L., C. & P.S. 271,
272 (1961): "The problem of deliberate violation of
the rights of the citizen by the police in their efforts
to obtain evidence has not been as pressing in Canada
as in some other countries.... In addition, the remedy
in tort has proved reasonably effective; Canadianjuries are quick to resent illegal activity on the part
of the police and to express that resentment by a pro-
portionate judgment for damages."
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the subject, the power of search is left so vague
and unregulated. But as always the preference
is for the unwritten law. The police are expected
to act reasonably; and so long as they do so,
the accused is as unlikely to insist upon his
right to immunity from search as he is on his
constitutional right to silence. The absence of
judicial regulation suggests the lack of need
for it; no situation has yet arisen in which
anything, corresponding to the Judges' Rules
has been called for.
"Cases in which the right of search has been
considered are from the lawyer's point of view
lamentably few." '
It may well be that at this time the imposition
of the exclusionary rule is neither necessary nor
proper in certain other lands. How does this
resolve our problem? I concede that we are in-
tellectually capable of formulating better alterna-
tives; I merely doubt that at the moment we are
politically capable of effectuating them. I confess,
further, that I am not enthused about scrapping
the exclusionary rule today in exchange for as-
surances that these other potentially superior
alternatives will undergo further study next year
or the year after.
I agree that the exclusionary rule is not the
best of all possible approaches in the best of all
worlds, but is there a real alternative in the present
state of affairs? After all, as Reinhold Niebuhr has
put it, "democracy is a method of finding proxi-
mate solutions for insoluble problems."98s
As Niebuhr has also observed, however, "any
definition of a proper balance between freedom
and order must always be at least slightly colored
by the exigencies of the moment which may make
the peril of the one seem greater and the security
of the other therefore preferable."99 Thus, to
establish that the exclusionary rule is the best
means at hand for effectuating liberty and privacy
is to make a point, but hardly to win the debate,
A host of questions-real questions, I admit-
remain to be answered. In one way or another,
they ask: What price, exclusionary rule?
"CIa WAVES" AND RuLEs Op EvIDENcE
Professor Inbau implies, if he does not assert,
that the 98% increase in the crime rate since
1950-five times the increase in population-is
7 DEvLiN, op. cit. supra note 95, at 64.98 NEBHRr, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE
CHILDRFR oF DA~mrss 118 (1944).9 1 Id. at 78.
the product of recent "'turn 'er loose' court
decisions and legislation." 00 He hints, none too
gently, that his and his daughter's freedom to
walk home after dark turns on whether or not we
rid law enforcement officers of "the strait jacket
placed upon them by present day court and
legislative restrictions."'01
Chief William Parker of the Los Angeles Police
Department, another vigorous critic of the ex-
clusionary rule, is not content with innuendo:
"Following the Cahan decision, there was a
departure from the trend of an accelerating
nature with such a skyrocketing effect that
December 1955 reflected the worst crime ex-
perience in the history of Los Angeles. In at-
tempting to determine cause, it must be con-
cluded that the greatest single factor repre-
senting a change in the current situation was
the imposition of the exclusionary rule at the
close of April 1955. As the criminal army be-
came familiar with the new safeguards provided
to them, the acceleration in crime was an
inevitable result."I 2
"[I]n Los Angeles during 1956 there was a
30 percent increase over the year before, after
we had experienced a downward trend. The
Cahan decision reversed the trend, and the
1957 rate is 14 percent over 1956....
"They are the facts. These are the things
they don't like to talk about. That is what is
happening throughout America.
"Q. Do you think the Mallory decision will
have a similar impact?
"Yes. I will show you how the Mallory de-
cision will put the Cahan decision to shame, as
far as effect upon serious crimes is concerned."' 0
Professor Inbau, Chief Parker, and others in
their camp raise real questions, all right. But do
they supply real answers? It may be my own
shortcoming, but I find so much so wrong with
their reasoning that I am not quite sure where
to begin.
100 Inbau 86. Professor Inbau is referring to FBI,
UNreoF m C:FmE REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1(1960) (hereinafter referred to as "UaoRm CRIM
REPORTs" for given year). In 1960, the crime rate for
seven major offenses-murder, forcible rape, robbery,
aggravated assault, larceny ($50 and over), and auto
theft-"was 24 per cent above the average for the past
5 years; 66 per cent over 1950, and 96 per cent higher
than 1940." Id. at 2.
101 lnbau 99.
'
02 PARx9R, POLICE 120 (Wilson ed. 1957).
103 1957 House Committee Hearings at 76.
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Perhaps the way to begin is to ask some ques-
tions of my own. Wat was the increase in the
crime rate from 1940 to 1950, when fewer juris-
dictions utilized the exclusionary rule? From 1930
to 1940? Rises in crime, Chief Parker tells us, are
"happening throughout America." But until the
summer of 1961, the courts of half our states
let in illegally seized evidence. Were these ad-
missibility jurisdictions undergoing "crime waves"
too? Or were the exclusionary states running well
ahead of the national average?
Take, for example, the District of Columbia and
its surrounding Maryland and Virginia suburbs.
Until Mapp was handed down in the summer of
1961, Maryland admitted illegally seized evidence
in all felony prosecutions; Virginia, in all cases.
On the other hand, the District's law enforcement
officers are not only "handcuffed" by the federal
exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases but
weighed down, too, by the McNabb-Mallory rule-
the dread "ball and chain" which hampered no
other police force during the 1950-1960 period.
One would expect the District, then, to set the
pace in crime acceleration, certainly far to out-
distance Virginia and Maryland.
The "facts" that fellows like me are not sup-
posed to want to talk about reveal that the District's
incidence of rapes, aggravated assaults and grand
larceny was lower in 1960 than in 1950.104 On a
per 100,000 population basis, the overall felony
rate increased a puny one per cent in the District,
but a redoubtable 69% in the three major Mary-
land and Virginia suburbs for which generally
complete figures were available. 5
No, I am not suggesting that the way to di-
minish crime is to adopt exclusionary rules of
evidence. I only suggest that to point to a spec-
tacular rise in national crime or in a particular
state's crime is hardly to prove that restrictive
rules of evidence have "caused" this increase.
10 See Mintz, Serious Crime Rate Down Here De-
spite Furor Raised by Congress, Washington Post,
July 5, 1961, p. B1, col. 6.
105 Ibid. Nation-wide, the crime rate for seven
major offenses rose 66 per cent during this period.
See note 100 supra. Preliminary figures compiled by
the police departments of the District and surrounding
suburbs for the 1961 calendar year indicate that the
incidence of serious crime in the suburbs is continuing
to rise at a greater rate than in the District. The seven-
category felony increase in the District from 1960 to
1961 was 9 per cent; suburban increases for that
period were: Fairfax, 21 per cent; Prince Georges, 20
per cent; Arlington, 15 per cent; Montgomery, '14
per cent; and Alexandria, 6 per cent. See Goshko,
Major Crime Rate Growing Faster in Suburbs Than
D. C., Washington Post, Mar. 11, 1962, p. B5, col. 1.
Opponents of the exclusionary rules will hasten
to point out, no doubt, that the above figures do
not tell the whole story. Of course they don't.
But why do they overlook the point when they
trot out the figures on California and Illinois
crime?
The explanation for the disparity in the crime
acceleration between the District and its suburbs
may lie in the explosive growth of the suburbs
and the concomitant slight decline in the District's
population. Or in the superior training of the
District police. Or in the undermanned suburban
police forces. Perhaps the key to the disparity is
that the suburbs compile more complete records
of crime than does the District, or better records
than they did back in 1950.
I must confess, therefore, that I don't think
these figures are decisive. Evidently, the critics of
the Weeks and McNabb-Mallory rules don't
either. For they have never had a word to say
about them. If I may be permitted to ask, what
dark inferences would Inbau, Parker & Co. draw
if these statistical disparities had been reversed?
If the District's crime had shot up 69% and the
suburbs but one per cent. Can you hear those
trumpets now?
Perhaps the peremptory answer to this "num-
bers game" may be found in a masterful, critical
analysis of the current sad state of criminal
statistics appearing in this very Journal a short
time ago. On that occasion, Ronald H. Beattie,
long-time Chief of the California Bureau of
Criminal Statistics, made an impressive showing
that various cities in the same state, to say nothing
of different states, are using such disparate methods
in crime reporting that "the differences observed
in Uniform Crime Reports simply cannot be
accepted as possessing any degree of reliability
for showing true differences in crime rates among
the states."'0 6
Though I believe Mr. Beattie's critical analysis
makes the "real facts" about the impact of rules
of evidence on crime somewhat fanciful, Chief
Parker has a right to be proud of Beattie's com-
ments:
"California, in particular, has a history of
police development over the past forty years,
stemming from the leadership of August Voll-
mer, which means not only high levels of police
efficiency and professional performance but
also better and more complete records. This
'
06Beattie, Criminal Statistics in the United States,
51 J. Cane L., C. & P.S. 49, 54 (1960).
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latter fact in itself causes California to appear
to have a high .crime rate. States where in
general there are many police agencies with
poor record systems, incomplete reporting, and
lower standards of police proficiency should not
be accredited as having less crime simply be-
cause the statistical data reported show less
crine."'
"Los Angeles showed an over-all crime rate
two and one-half times as great as San Jose,
and this difference appears in all offenses.
The widest difference occurs in aggravated
assault, where the rates reported were 13 times
greater for Los Angeles than for San Jose.
"Sacramento and Fresno, which represent
valley metropolitan areas presumably not tob
different in general composition, showed rather
strange differences in crimes reported....
"This kind of comparison vividly demon-
strates the wide differences in reporting from
departments and areas within the same state.
Actually, no conclusions about crime rates can
possibly be made with any certainty from this
kind of information. The Los Angeles area in
particular has been named in public releases
as having the highest crime rate in the country.
The Los Angeles Police Department has been
an outstanding department for many years.
It has been recognized as one of the most
effective and efficient large metropolitan police
agencies in the country. It would appear that
because this department is effective and effi-
cient, and has complete records, the area is
being identified as one with a high crime rate in
comparison with other cities that do not have
police departments of the standard and quality
that Los Angeles possesses and do not keep as
efficient and complete records of the incidence
of crime."' 08
Mr. Beattie cozdd be wrong; the statistics may
truly reflect the extent of crime in various cities
and states. However, I fail to see how this possi-
bility aids the critics of the exclusionary rules.
Suppose Los Angeles really does have 1300%
the aggravated assault San Jose has? Why? They
are both in the state of California and both subject
to the same rules of evidence. What if the crime
rates in the comparable cities of Sacramento and
Fresno vary as much as the published figures
107 Id. at 53-54.108 Id. at 55.
indicate? Suppose Sacramento does have nearly
twice the forcible rape rate of Fresno, and Fresno a
much higher aggravated assault rate than Sacra-
mento. Whatever the reason, how can it be the
Cahan decision?
Similar questions can be raised about the
state of crime in Illinois. Why is Chicago's burglary
rate less than twice that of Champaign-Urbana,
Peoria, and Rockford, but its robbery rate about
five times that of Champaign-Urbana and Peoria
and more than twenty times that of Rockford?
Why is it that Peoria and Champaign-Urbana are
about the same in total offense rate, but
Champaign-Urbana has about three times the
murder-voluntary manslaughter and aggravated
assault rates of Peoria?1 9 If these striking intra-
state statistical disparities at all approximate the
"real facts," don't they serve to illumine the
insignificance, if not irrelevance, of the state-wide
exclusionary rule?
The 98% crime rise which Professor Inbau
glibly tosses into the fray is a familiar figure.
This is how J. Edgar'Hoover opened an inter-
view early this year. 10 Perhaps this is the place
to begin. Midway in this interview, the Director of
the FBI was asked to account for the sharp rise in
crime. He spoke of the "steady decline of parental
authority," the disintegration of "moral standards
in home and community," the "highly suggestive,
and, at times, offensive, scenes" on TV and in
the movies, "public indifference to organized
vice," the number of people who "lack the courage
to aid the victim personally, or the interest to
summon help," and the "abuse and maladmin-
istration of the systems of parole and probation".'
Nary a word about rules of evidence.
Mr. Hoover's discussion of the problem was
comprehensive, but hardly exhaustive. Other
"causes" of crime and "crime waves" advanced
from time to time are "tensions" from two world
wars and/or the "cold war," the "strain" of
modern living; the crowding of rural people un-
accustomed to urban ways into the big cities;
the population movement of the Negroes, the
demise of the billy dub, the displacement of the
foot patrolman with the squad car, more laws,
better crime reporting, comic books, cigarette
10' Based on Table 4-Index of Crime, 1960, Stand-
ard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, UNrolu C1ME
R1Loirs for 1960 at 53-77.
11 U.S. News & World Rep., Jan. 1, 1962, p. 34.
" 'Id. at 35-36.
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smoking, poor housing, overcrowded schools,
"bad blood," ad infinitum.
While crime in the District of Columbia is still
down from the peak years in the early 1950's it is
up from the ten-year low set in 1957."n What
"'caused" this increase? The U.S. Attorney pointed
to the "woefully and demonstratively under-
staffed" Juvenile Court, ill-equipped to "win
away from a life of crime those border-line juvenile
delinquents.""' One District Commissioner found
the "main reason" in "more probations," "earlier
paroles" and the fact that "drunks are sometimes
sent home rather than to jail."rn This was im-
mediately disputed by another Commissioner,
who suggested "the cutback in the activities of
the Metropolitan Police Boys Club [from 17,000
boys served, down to 5,000 in two years] may
have contributed.""15
He -who links "crime waves" with rules of
-evidence is a bold man. Bolder than Oliver Gasch,
former U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia,
who after wrestling with the McNabb-Mallory
rule and the Weeks rule for six years, dismissed
this suggestion as "much too speculative."
'un
"He must be a bold man indeed who is confident
that he knows what causes crime. Those whose
lives are devoted to an understanding of the
problem are certain only that they are uncertain
regarding the role of the various 'alleged' 'causes'
of crime.""7
Perhaps this is not the way to start answering
the "crime wave" argument. Perhaps we should
begin further back, by asking: What "crime wave"?
w See Mintz, supra note 104, at p. B2.
I' Gasch, supra note 80, at 6.
M Washington Post, Mar. 27, 1960, p. A27, col. 6
(Comm'r Robert F. McLaughlin).
2 Ibid. (Comm'r David P. Karrick).
116 Gasch supra note 80, at 7, quoted in MacKenzie,
Mallory Ruding Held Blameless in Crime Rise, Wash-
ington Post, Mar. 26, 1960, p. D1, col. 7. But more
recently Deputy Police Chief Edgar E.'Scott blamed
the "rise" in District "street crimes" (as against the
ten-year low-point of 1957) partly on "civil libertar-
•ians who scream about the Constitution, due process
and the Bill of Rights," centering his criticism of the
Courts on the Mallory decision. At the same time,
Scott insisted that "the fight to maintain moral stand-
ards and good law enforcement is tied with the fight
against communism, because... nations fall from
weakness and corruption from within, rather than
power from without." MacKenzie, Scott Blames 'Civil
Libertarians' for Street Crime, Washington Post,
Mar. .27, 1962, p. B1, col. 2. Chief Scott did not ex-
plain why crime is increasing more rapidly in the sub-
urbs of Virginia and Maryland-which have no Mc-
Nabb-Mallory rule.
17 Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 526-27 (1948).
As Professor Herbert Wechsler, Chief Reporter
for the Model Penal Code, and a former state and-
federal assistant attorney general, observed awhile
back: "We cannot even be certain that the sta-
tistics on crimes 'known to the police' actually
indicate an increase in the amount of crime."
For "better attention to complaints, more careful
and systematic efforts to record and count offenses,
more arrests, will make your crime rate go up
higher on paper than in actual fact."
This is not mere speculation. There are striking
examples of "crime waves" which turned out to
be nothing more than "statistical reporting
waves." When a Philadelphia reform mayor's
police commissioner assumed office in 1952, he
discovered that for years records had been dis-
torted in order to "minimize" crime, e.g., one
center-city district in one month handled 5,000
more complaints than it had recorded. When a
new central reporting system was installed, the
number of "crimes" went up from 16,800 in 1951
to 28,600 in 1953-"for the record" a staggering
climb of over 70% In New York City, similar
faking had gone on for years. Following a survey
by police expert Bruce Smith, a new system
of central recording was established for 1952.
Assaults immediately jumped 47%, robberies
73%, and burglaries 118%!" 0
I have little doubt that Superintendent Orlando
W. Wilson, if he were not the careful student of
crime he is,. could contrive an enormous increase
in the amount of Chicago's crime. For shortly
after he became head of the Chicago force he
undertook a drastic revamping of the depart-
ment's methods of reporting crime and main-
taining records. For the first time, a crime analysis
section at police headquarters now works from
complete records on all crimes, big or small."'
Common practices of the pre-Wilson era, it seems,
were not to report stolen cars as stolen in statistical
records if they were recovered within three days,
and for a commander to "follow a practice of
ignoring a lot of the little stuff to save work and
make the district look better on paper."'m
"' U. S. News & World Rep., Sept. 26, 1960, p. 64.
"1 Bell, What Crime Wave? Fortune, Jan., 1955, pp.
96, 99. See also Bell, The Myth of Crime Waves, in
TH END or IDEor oGa 138-39 (1960).
"2 Ibid.
1 See Gowran, Wilson Plea: More Radios, More
Records, Chicago Daily Tribune, Nov. 8, 1961, pt. 1,
p. 8, col. 1.i Ibid.
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DID T CAHAN CASE "CRIPPLE" CALIFORmA
LAW ENFORCEMENT?
Not only do critics of the exclusionary rule in
search and seizure cases argue that its imposition
swells the ranks of the "criminal army" but they
also indicate that it has "rendered the people
powerless to adequately protect themselves against
the criminal army." The two contentions can be
separated and distinguished. The first conten-
tion-the rule breeds more crime---may not be
true, but the second contention-the rule seriously
diminishes the capacity of law enforcement to
cope with whatever crime is bred-may never-
theless be true.
Chief Parker found evidence of the severe blow
dealt to efficient law enforcement by the Cahan
decision in the, reduction of narcotic arrests:
"During 1954 the comparative [seasonal] periods
reflected a 15.7 per cent increase in [narcotic]
arrests, while a 4.5 per cent decrease followed the
Cahan decision."1 21
Again, I venture to suggest that the chief has
skipped a premise or two. For example, what are
the comparative figures on narcotic offenses
reported? On suspects released after arrest? On
narcotic offenders formally charged? Convicted?
In any event, assuming Chief Parker's reliance
on the arrest data is well placed, what does the
"record" show? Adult felony arrests for narcotic
law violations in California did drop slightly in
1955, from 7,457 to 7,313, but they were over
9,000 in 1956, over 10,000 in 1957, and, rising
steadily and substantially every post-Cahan year,
passed the 14,000 mark in 1960.'m True, Cali-
fornia's population has boomed, but the rate of
adult felony arrests for narcotics per 100,000
population, which dipped from 60 to 56 in 1955,
rose to 67 and 73.1 in 1956 and 1957, respectively,
and reached 89.2 in 1960.12 If the 1955 decline in
narcotic arrests illustrates the blow Cahan dealt
law enforcement, what do these more recent
figures evidence?
J. Francis Coakley, District Attorney for
Alameda County, California, also sounded the
alarm in the summer of 1956 by reporting that
223 PARKER, POLICE 121 (Wilson ed. 1957).
'u See CAIF. SPzEMAL STUDY COM'N ON NARcoTIcs,
FINAL REPORT 53 (1961) (hereinafter referred to as
"FINAL NARCOTICS REPORT"); CALIF. DEPT. OF JUS-
TICE, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME IN
CALIFORNIA 1960, at 47 (hereinafter referred to as
"CRME IN CALIFORNIA" for given year).
15 CR IN CALIFORNIA 1956, at 35; 1957, at 32;
1960, at 45.
"the Cahan decision establishing the Exclusionary
Rule in California has broken the very backbone
of narcotics enforcement. 12 6 The only statistical
support I can find for this sweeping statement is
that the rate of felony narcotic complaints per
100,000 population flied in California Superior
Court fell from 22 to 18 in 19551" and the per-
centage of narcotics convictions in California
Superior Courts dropped from 86.6 to 77.6 in
1955, and to a still lower 76.8 in 1956.128
In 1957 the rate of narcotic complaints reached
23 per 100,000,129 passing the pre-Cahan rate, and
climbed to 25 in 1959, where it has remained 30
But critics of the exclusionary rule can find some
solace in the percentage of convictions in narcotics
cases. Following the Cahan case, this percentage
dropped for three successive years to a low of 74.3
in 1957.131 While it has climbed back slowly to
77.5 in 1960,1 this is still considerably short of
the pre-Cahan figures of 82.5 (1952) 84.4 (1953)
and 86.6 (1954).11 Why?
In 1957, looking at the narcotics and book-
making, the two offenses whose conviction per-
centage had dropped substantially since the
Cahan case, the California Bureau of Criminal
Statistics suggested the obvious: "Evidently, the
adoption of the exclusionary rule has had some
effect on these two offense groups.' 3 4 Two years
later, however, the Bureau was more cautious.
Indeed, it balked at linking the Cahan rule with
these lowered conviction rates, noting that "the
large number of cases in Los Angeles County
often distorts the picture for the rest of the
State."3 5
The 1954 Los Angeles 85 per cent conviction
rate in narcotic offenses fell to 67 percent in 1957,
before it rose somewhat to 70 in 1958 and 73 in
1959, but there was "very little change in other
areas of the state."1 6 From 1954 to 1959, for
example, "the nine other Southern California
counties in contrast varied only between a high
126 ABA, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION OF
CRmIMIAL LAw 58 (1956).
m CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 1955, at 42.
128 CRIME IN CALIFORNA 1954, at 60; 1955, at 60;
1956, at 61.29 CRIM IN CALIFORNIA 1957, at 53.
130 CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 1960, at 95.
1I CRIME IN CALIFORIA 1957, at 66.
132 CRIE IN CALIFORNIA 1958, at 62 (75.1%); 1959,
at 67 (77.3%); 1960, at 104 (77.5%).
SCRME IN CALIFORNIA 1952, at 38; 1953, at 47;
1954, at 60.
14 CRmnjN CALIFoRNIA 1957, at 66-67.
15 CR l Nl CALIFORNIA 1959, at 68.11 Id. at 68-69.
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and a low of 88 and 85 percent convicted, re-
spectively."'13 The same patterns held for book-
making. The only conclusion the Bureau could
reach was:
"Many things, other than the Cahan decision
may be affecting the statistics on narcotics and
bookmaking convictions in Los Angeles County.
What has just been reported does not, in itself,
prove or disprove any aspect of the multifaceted
problem. All that can be said, with validity, is
that convictions for narcotics and bookmaking
in Los Angeles County have decreased since
1954 and that they continue to remain at a
relatively low level."'1
Further illumination is furnished by a six month
study (Aug. 1, 1960, through January 31, 1961)
made by the District Attorney's Office, County
of Los Angeles, to determine the effect of the
Cahan and Priestly decisions on narcotic cases.
Of the total processed 1,420 narcotic cases which
came to the attention of the District Attorney's
Office during this period, those rejected by the
District Attorney or dismissed by the Court
because of Cahan or Priestly and those which
resulted in an acquittal for the same reason came
to a grand total of 128--"approximately eight
percent." 39
During this same period, another 615 Los
Angeles cases (140 in Superior Court) were dis-
missed, rejected, or otherwise "lost" for non-
exclusionary rule reasons.140 How does this com-
pare with the pre-Cahan Los Angeles experience?
If the California Attorney General's impression
that Cahan led to "much more intensive [pre-
arrest] work" in the field of narcotics is accurate,4'
and these observations hold for Los Angeles as
well as the rest of the state, shouldn't Cahan be
credited with a few narcotic conviction "assists,"
too? And shouldn't these offset the "losses" a bit?
If not, let me suggest another reason for sup-
137 Ibid.
138 Id. at 69.
'19 FmAL. NA concs REPORT 112. Eleven of the ex-
clusionary rule releases were said to be due to the re-
quirement established by Priestly v. Superior Court,
50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P. 2d 39 (1958), that an informant's
identity must be disclosed where this information is
the only evidence to establish "probable cause." This
rule was cut down significantly in May of 1961 when
the California Supreme Court held that where a search
is made pursuant to a warrant valid on its face, the
informer's identity need not be revealed in order to
establish the legality of the search. People v. Keener,
55 Cal. 2d 714, 12 Cal. Rep. 859, 361 P.2d 587 (1961).
4 FiAL NARconcs REPORT 112.
1 See text at note 78 supra.
posing the "true figure" is probably lower than
eight per cent. Some 439 other Los Angeles felony
narcotic cases processed during the study period
were not considered in the calculations because
they had not yet reached "final disposition."'4'
According to the study, however, the Cahan-
Priestly factor looms largest at the initial stages
of a case. Thus, of the 128 "losses" due to the
exclusionary rule, only 38 occurred after the cases
were brought to Superior Court.i4 To look at it
another way, the exclusionary rule was a factor in
only 4.4% of the 866 cases which reached Superior
Court. There is reason to believe, therefore, that
if the other 439 cases were followed up and taken
into account the eight percent figure would be
appreciably lower.
Furthermore, whatever the true figure in Los
Angeles, there is good cause for supposing the
exclusionary rule is a significantly smaller factor
in other California narcotic cases. For, as already
noted, the narcotics conviction percentage runs
about ten points higher outside Los Angeles.
In any event, this much is not speculation: ruling
out the exclusionary rule factor, the Los Angeles
felony narcotics conviction percentage is still
lower than most other California areas, taking
into account the exclusionary factor.
This, too, must be said about the narcotics
situation in California. When we stop thinking
about narcotic offenses in lump form and start
viewing the matter in terms of specific types of
narcotic offenses we discover that while the 1960
statewide overall narcotics conviction percentage
in California Superior Courts was 77.5, the state-
wide figures for both sales of marijuana and sales
of narcotics other than marijauna'were 88.2 and
88.7, respectively.1 " To look at it another way,
of the 460 narcotic cases dismissed in 1960, "ap-
proximately four-fifths were possession cases";
"there were only a total of 33 sale cases and 9
sale to minor cases dismissed.' 45
Finally, it should'not be forgotten that while
the overall narcotics conviction percentage is
down substantially, from 85.5 in the 1953-1954
pre-Cahan years to 77.4 for the years 1959-1960,
the rate of arrests as well as felony complaints
filed in narcotic cases his risen appreciably. Thus,
in 1959-1960, which experienced a substantially
lower conviction percentage, some 5,696 were
'42 FNAL NARcoTics R-EPORT 112.
2 Ibid.
144 Ci= mi CALrnoRNiA 1960, at 122.
's Id. at 77.
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convicted of narcotic offenses in California Su-
perior Courts'48 as against 4,419 for the record
conviction percentage years of 1953-1954.117
I tbink I have demonstrated that the predictions
and descriptions of near-disaster in narcotics law
enforcement which greeted and followed the
Cahan decision find precious little support in
the available data. Until now, however, we have
been dwelling on narcotic offenses-the major
category of crime most likely to be affected by the
exclusionary rule. But opponents of the rule have
proclaimed its adverse effects on crime and law
enforcement generally. Chief Parker reported its
effect "catastrophic as far as efficient law enforce-
ment is concerned";148 he considered it "con-
ceivable that the imposition of the exclusionary
rule has rendered the people powerless to ade-
quately protect themselves against the criminal
army."'49 An assistant attorney general for the
State of California called the Cahan rule "the
'Magna Carta' for the criminals."'150 "Crime
statisti6 indicate he is right," declared Chief
Carl Hansson of the Dallas Police Department.
"Many states," he tells us, "have adopted the
Exclusionary Rule to the joy of the criminal and
the detriment of society."'' What can be gleaned
from the records about the effect Cahan has had
on California conviction rates generally?
The conviction percentage for murder, 67.1 in
1953, and 61.2 in 1954, was up to 69.8 in 1960;
manslaughter, 81.1 and 90.2 in 1953 and 1954,
respectively, is now at 93.2; felony assault, under
77.5 for the two pre-Cahan years, was 81.3 in
1960; rape, 76.5 and 79.3 in the two years im-
mediately preceding Cahan, is now at 81.4.152
Variances in conviction percentages relating to
robbery and burglary are barely discernible.
Robbery, 84.8 in 1953 and 85.8 the following
year, rose to 86.3 the year of the Cahan decision,
and is now at 85.4. The conviction percentage for
burglary, which increased four-tenths of one per
cent from 1953 to the 1954 figure of 90.8, de-
creased the same four-tenths to 90.4 in the Cahan
year and is now at 89.6.153
148 CaRncm n CArpoRIA 1959, at 67; 1960, at 104.
147 CRnm N CAr O A 1953, at 47; 1954, at 60.
348 PARiER, PoricE 114 (Wilson ed. 1957).
'49 Id. at 118.
150 Reported in ABA, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF
S ON or CaImqAL LAW 54 (1956).
151 Ibid.
15 CRa i CALmomIA 1953, at 47; 1954, at 60;
1960, at 104.
'W Ibid.
The overall felony conviction percentage
averaged 84.5 for the three years immediately
preceding Cahan,'" registered 85.4 for the Cahan
year, 55 and has been at 86.4 (including the afore-
mentioned lower narcotic percentage) for the
last three years.'55 Of course, the number of felony
defendants convicted in California Superior
Courts has risen substantially; for example, from
17,359 in the last pre-Cahan year'5 ' to the 1960
total of 24,816.151
Dm =rm MALLORY CASE "CRPP. E" LAW
ENF R c .NT iN = Dsmrcr
oF CoLUMTIA?
Four years ago, in his testimony before a
Senate subcommittee, Professor Inbau "suggested"
that "we are paying a great price for the Mallory
rule."'I5 Last year, in the pages of this Journal,
he was less cautious: "In the federal jurisdiction
of Washington, D. C., which must cope with a
variety of criminal offenses and problems similar
to any other city of comparable size, this federal
court rule has had a very crippling effect on police
investigations."'160 Of course, Professor Inbau's
voice has been but one of many raised in alarm.
And the voices have been shrill indeed.
Thus, in his 1957 testimony before a House sub-
committee, Robert Murray, Chief of the District's
Police Department, stated flatly that "if the
Mallory decision stands, it will result in complete
breakdown in law enforcement in the District of
Columbia."' ' Chief Murray claimed, then, that
"an overwhelming majority of these major crime
cases, and maybe as much as 90 per cent, are
solved after the subject has been brought in
and questioned."' 62
Deputy Chief of Police Edgar Scott picked up
and amplified his superior's 90 per cent figure:
"The application of the Mallory rule would
prevent the clearance of a majority of the
planned crimes and serious crimes and those
committed by professionals.
"I wish to emphasize that a little bit more
because I think what the Chief meant on the 90
'" CRn N CAmoRwu 1955, at 44.
155 Ibid.
155 C s 3xn CALIomNIA 1958, at 62 (86.6%);
1959, at 67 (86.4%); 1960, at 104 (86.3%).
'5' CR- nq CAuooos 1954, at 60.
'in CR= 'N CAnaoRmA 1960, at 104.
9 1958 Senate Committee Hearings at 73.
'50 Inbau, Police Interrogation-A Practical Neces-
sity, 52 J. Cmmo L., C. & P.S. 16, 20 (1961).
181 1957 House Committee Hearings at 42.
'52 Id. at 43.
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per cent was that 90 per cent of these types of
crimes by professionals are planned crimes and
could -not be cleared.
"There's another type of crime [unplanned]
that would bring the overall clearance to a
better figure, and I would say it would still be a
majority of the crimes that could not be cleared,
but of the ones committed which are planned
by professionals and that had planned them
ahead of time, I think the figure of 90 per cent
is all right."'6
"Mr. Cramer. As to that figure that Chief
Scott indicated, that about 90 per cent of the
cases require investigation, and fairly lengthy
investigation, and a majority of the 90 per
cent would require investigation within the
lengthy period of time ruled out in the Mallory
casei what you are saying is that of the planned
crimes, planned by the professional criminal,
90 per cent would probably go free as a result
of their knowledge of the Mallory case and their
unwillingness to cooperate.
"Mr. Scott. Under the application of the
Mallory case; yes, sir."''1
The 1957 Mallory decision did stand. Consider
the testimony some time later of Howard Covell,
Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the District
Police Department:
"First, those tables will show that, viewed in
its relationship to the long-term trend in this
city and nationwide, the present rate of crime
in the District of Columbia is not excessive and,
in fact, is favorably low.
"In brief, the calendar year 1958 crime rate
of the District is only 6.7 per cent above the
all-time low rate of the fiscal year 1957, is 31.5
per cent below the peak rate of calendar year
1952, and is 20.4 per cent below the rate of
calendar year 1949, while the- nationwide
crime rate, as estimated by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, has increased steadily and
by more than 50 per cent since 1949." 165
"Mr. Santangelo. As a matter of fact, it
appears to me that the percentage of solutions
of the major crimes has increased down through
the years?
'"Chief Covell. I would say yes.
"1 Id. at 45.
'" Id. at 46.
16 Hearings on District of Columbia Appropriatios
for 1960 at 419.
"Mr. Santangelo. For the last 3 years let
us say, the homicides, rapes, and aggravated
assaults, your percentage of solutions has in-
creased, has it not?
"Chief Covell. I would say yes, but that also
comes from, and I say this with modesty, from
an increased efficiency of the Police Department
and better coordination of the law enforcement
agencies throughout the entire metropolitan
area. I think that the cooperation of all de-
partments in' this area reflects in each other's
department to some extent.... During the
fiscal year 1958 there was a total of 51 per cent
of all part 1 crimes [major offenses] solved as
compared with 49.5 during 1957. The rate of
clearance in 1958 is second to the highest;
that was 55.6 attained by the Department
since the installation of the present system of
reporting, which was made in 1948."166
Consider, too, the testimony of Chief Murray
the following year:
"Mr. Santangelo.... Can you tell us what your
experience in 1959 was with respect to the
solution of crimes of criminal homicide and
the other major crimes?"
"Chief Murray.... The average is 52.5, which
I think is perhaps about double or nearly double
the national average. I think the national
average on clearance of cases is about 27 per
cent. It runs consistently about 27 per cent.
"Mr. Santangelo. Last year, in 1958, the per-
centage of solution of crimes was 51 per cent,
and in the year 1959 it was 52.5 per cent. So
your percentage of efficiency has increased to
that extent. Is that a correct statement?
"Chief Murray. Yes, sir; plus the fact that we
have had a few more men to help us dear it ......
"Mr. Santangelo. Your percentage of solutions
has increased in the cases of robbery.
"Chief Murray. Yes, sir; we have, I think, a
very good record in the clearance of robberies,
65 per cent.
"Mr. Santangelo. That rose from 61.3.
"Chief Murray. Yes, sir."
*g * *g
"Mr. Santangelo. In aggravated assault, you
also have gone up from 84.3 to 88 per cent. In
housebreaking, which is another difficult thing
266 Id. at 440-41.
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to solve, you have gone up from 50.5 to 54
per cent. Is that correct?
"Chief Murray. Yes, sir.
"Mr. Santangelo. For which I commend you,
Chief Murray."67
Remember the 90 per cent figure the District's
police officials tossed out back in 1957? Listen
to United States District Attorney Oliver Gasch
three years later:
"Another point I should like to emphasize
concerning this issue is that while Mallory
questions are well publicized they do not occur
in every case. In fact, Mallory questions, that
is to say, confessions or admissions, are of
controlling importance in probably less than
5% of our criminal prosecutions. At the present
time, due largely to the conscientious coopera-
tion of our Chief of Police and in accordance
with the teaching of the decisions and our lec-
tures on it, the police are making better cases
from the evidentiary standpoint. Extensive
investigation prior to arrest of suspects has
resulted. The accumulation of other evidentiary
material has become standard operating pro-
cedure."
"On the affirmative side, it can be said that
police work generally is more thorough and
exact. Reliance upon confessions generally has
been minimized. It must be mentioned, how-
ever, that in some instances we have been un-
able to go forward with cases wherein we felt
that we were largely dependent upon a confes-
sion and the confession was inadmissible under
the Mallory Doctrine. Pleas to lesser included
offenses have been accepted; and from the
police standpoint, their ability to clear through
interrogation other offenses of which the in-
dividual was believed involved has been re-
duced. The recovery of stolen property from
such individuals has been hampered by reason
of the need for arraignment without unnecessary
delay. In short, the emphasis has been on ac-
cording persons arrested a preliminary hearing
with the utmost dispatch."
To me, one of the important aspects of our
local law enforcement pictures is this: Prior to
the Mallory decision our police had an out-
standingly high rate with reference to solving
167 Hearings on District of Columbia Appropriations
for 1961 at 619-20.
crimes. That rate is still outstandingly high.
This is a great tribute to Chief Murray and
his men. They have worked hard and effec-
tively. Lesser men would have thrown up their
hands in despair."u6
CONCLUSION
It is true that the immediate effect of the
McNabb-Mallory rule or the Weeks rule is often
to free the "obviously guilty," but the rationale is
these "hospital cases" have much more far reach-
ing and much more salutary effects. This is neither
a new nor a novel theory. The late Karl Llewellyn
expressed it well a generation ago, talking about,
of all things, the law of contracts:
"[M]y guess is... that the real major effect of
law will be found not so much in the cases in
which law officials actually intervene, nor yet
in those in which such intervention is con-
sciously contemplated as a possibility, but
rather in contributing to, strengthening, stiffen-
ing attitudes toward performance as what is
to be expected and what 'is done'. If the con-
tract dodger canwt be bothered, if all he needs
is a rhinoceros hide to thumb his nose at his
creditor with impunity, more and more men
will become contract dodgers... [In this
aspect each hospital case is a case with sig-
nifica:nie for the hundreds of thousands of
normal cases."'16 9
How well this theory works-in the form of the
McNabb-Mallory 'and Weeks rules-remains to
be seen. At the moment it appears to be doing
quite nicely in the District of Columbia, the
jurisdiction which has felt the brunt of what
Inbau calls "turn 'em loose" court decisions.
The work of the District police "generally is
more thorough and exact," "reliance upon con-
fessions generally has been minimized," "the
accumulation of other evidentiary material has
become standard operating procedure," "ex-
tensive investigation prior to arrest of suspects
has resulted."'' 0 This, as the song goes, is the
whole idea.
If you are against the exclusionary rules it is
helpful to think they exact an exorbitant price in
increased crime and diminished law enforcement.
This makes resolution of the issue easy. But in
the two jurisdictions which have held the spot-
,61 Gasch supra note 80, at 3, 4, 7.
" Llewellyn, What Price Contrac?-An Essay in
Perspectire, 40 YALE L. J. 704, 725 n.47 (1931).
170 Gasch supra note 80, at 3-4.
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light in recent years, the District of Columbia and
the State of California, there is no tangible evidence
that the rules have done any thing of the kind.
Of course, if you are for the exclusionary rules,
it is comforting to believe that their cost in
"letting alone" or "freeing" criminals is de minimis.
This also makes resolution of the debate easy.
f do not know (and I doubt) that the cost is or
will be de minimis. I do think I know that op-
ponents of the rule have not established the
contrary. They have made loud noises about the
"disasterous" and "catastrophic" prices we are
paying to effectuate constitutional liberties, but
they have yet to furnish convincing evidence that
the price is even substantial.
Even if by some miracle we could cleanly
disentangle the exclusionary rule from the many
other factors which "cause' crime or reduce the
efficiency of police and prosecutors, I suspect
Professor Inbau and I would still disagree. I
suspect he would 'contend the data proves "we
can't afford" the rule and I would maintain-
unless the data greatly surprises me-that "it's
cheap at the price." For we would still differ over
the value of the commodity purchasedY' It
171 And; no doubt, as to the bbjective standards by
which "police efficiency" can be judged. See Weisberg,
makes a: lot of difference whether one views the
fourth amendment as a fundamental safeguard
against serious abuses or whether one thinks of it as
merely a provision dealing with a formality.ln
I am for the exclusionary rule as the best means
available or presently feasible for enforcing guar-
antees of liberty and privacy. Professor Inbau
tells us he believes in these rights, too.iu How
does he propose to effectuate them?
He suggests that in the McNabb case the Court
might have "contented itself with an incidental
reprimand to federal officers for failing to comply
with statutory requirements regarding arraigu-
ment."'7 As for illegal search or seizure, he feels
that "an effective way to teach a policeman a
lesson is by bringing a civil suit directly against
him."175
I leave it to the reader to decide which of us is
"starry eyed."
Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical
View, 52 J. Cpam L., C. & P.S. 21, 37 (1961).
"7 See Frankfurter, J., dissenting in United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950).
i7 See Inbau 86.
174 Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United
States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L, Rav. 442, 451 (1948).
175 ABA, SUMMARy or PRocEEDms OF SECTION
OF CRInMNAL LAW 60 (1956).
